Role of justice theory in explaining alliance negotiations, The
We report data from a revelatory qualitative case study of a failed attempt to negotiate an international joint venture agreement. We analyze issues of justice and the role that their occurrence in the course of the negotiations might have played in this outcome. These potential antecedents of the failure were derived from theories of organizational justice. The results support an argument that organizational justice theory, particularly interactional justice, can play an important role in explaining alliance negotiation outcomes.
|Date of creation:||17 Jan 2004|
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- Ariño, Africa & de la Torre, Jose & Ring, Peter S., 2001. "Relational quality: Managing trust in corporate alliances," IESE Research Papers D/434, IESE Business School.
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