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Awareness and equilibrium

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  • Hill, Brian

Abstract

There has been a recent surge of interest among economists in developing models of doxastic states that can account for some aspects of human cognitive limitations that are ignored by standard formal models, such as awareness. Epistemologists purport to have a principled reason for ignoring the question of awareness: under the equilibrium conception of doxastic states they favour, a doxastic state comprises the doxastic commitments an agent would recognise were he fully aware, so the question of awareness plays no role. The objective of this paper is to scrutinize this argument.

Suggested Citation

  • Hill, Brian, 2010. "Awareness and equilibrium," HEC Research Papers Series 939, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0939
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leandro Rêgo & Joseph Halpern, 2012. "Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 131-155, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bounded rationality; awareness; doxastic states; cognitive equilibrium; belief change; formal epistemology.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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