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Une étude d'histoire militaire instruite par la Théorie des jeux et quelques amplifications Méthodologiques

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  • Mongin, Philippe

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Abstract

The paper suggests that military history should be subjected to modelling based on the mathematical theories of rational choice, and especially the theory of games. This suggestion primarily concerns military events that have already been reported in narratives focusing on the agents' instrumental rationality, such as Clausewitz's narrative of the Waterloo campaign.

Suggested Citation

  • Mongin, Philippe, 2007. "Une étude d'histoire militaire instruite par la Théorie des jeux et quelques amplifications Méthodologiques," Les Cahiers de Recherche 866, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0866
    as

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    File URL: http://www.hec.fr/hec/fr/professeurs_recherche/upload/cahiers/MonginHistoiremilitaire0307.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert J. Leonard, 1995. "From Parlor Games to Social Science: Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory, 1928-1994," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(2), pages 730-761, June.
    2. Philippe Mongin, 2002. "Le principe de rationalité et l'unité des sciences sociales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(2), pages 301-323.
    3. Robert H. Bates & Avner Greif & Margaret Levi & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1998. "Analytic Narratives," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 6355.
    4. Philippe Mongin, 2006. "Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(290), pages 257-286, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    military history; rational choice theories; game theory; zero-sum; two person games; analytical narrative; narrative; historical event; Napoléon; Blücher; Grouchy; Waterloo;

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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