Financing decisions of firms and central bank policy
This paper aims to explain the sharp rise in unhedged foreign borrowing by South East Asian corporations in the few years prior to the crisis despite remarkably little change in fundamentals. The crucial element of our story is the strategic interaction between firms and the central bank, which gives rise to multiple equilibria: when firms use foreign borrowing, they raise the cost of devaluation to the central bank, which in turn makes foreign borrowing more attractive. Consequently, a small shock to fundamentals may have a large and permanent effect on the equilibrium composition of firms' borrowing.
|Date of creation:||01 Apr 2001|
|Date of revision:|
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- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, 1998. "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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