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The Incidence And Performance Effects Of Interlocking Directorates In Emerging Market Business Groups : Evidence From India

Author

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  • Bikram De

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

Abstract

The phenomenon of interlocking directorates is widespread among corporate across the world. This paper studies the structure and extent of interlocking directorates within Indian business groups and analyses the performance effects of such interlocks. It finds that large groups tend to have more interlocks and more heterogeneous the group is, lesser are the interlocks. Finance and trading companies are seen to have a higher intensity of interlocks and holding companies occupy important nodes in the directorial network. The paper also shows that directorial interlocks improve the performance of group-affiliated firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Bikram De, 2003. "The Incidence And Performance Effects Of Interlocking Directorates In Emerging Market Business Groups : Evidence From India," Microeconomics Working Papers 22390, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:eab:microe:22390
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    File URL: http://www.eaber.org/node/22390
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    Cited by:

    1. Aylin Ataay, 2016. "Roles of Interlocking Directorates in an Emerging Country: Control and Coordination in Family Business Groups," Eurasian Journal of Business and Management, Eurasian Publications, vol. 4(2), pages 106-116.
    2. Bandyopadhyay, Arindam & Barua, Nandita Malini, 2016. "Factors determining capital structure and corporate performance in India: Studying the business cycle effects," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 160-172.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interlocking directorates; board structure; corporate governance.;

    JEL classification:

    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models

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