Optimal Obscurity in the Acquisition and Disclosure of Information about a Shock
A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield benefits only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by controlling the quality of his information, and the disclosure rule. We show that even when the acquisition of perfect information is costless, the principal may optimally acquire imperfect information when his own action eliminates the agent's incentive to take action against the risk.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/index-e.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fischhoff, Baruch, 1994. "What forecasts (seem to) mean," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 387-403, November.
- Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
- Anke Kessler, 1998. "The Value of Ignorance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 339-354, Summer.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0832. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.