Tax Loss Offset Restrictions - Last Resort for the Treasury?: An Empirical Evaluation of Tax Loss Offset Restrictions Based on Micro Data
In Germany, the tax loss carry-forward of corporations significantly increased over the last decade. At the same time only a small percentage of losses have been effectively offset in the following periods. One potential reason for this puzzle is that stricter loss offset restrictions have been introduced in recent years. I use a newly developed micro simulation model for the corporate sector in Germany to evaluate the fiscal effects of these restrictions. Additionally, distributional breakdowns concerning the amounts of tax loss carry-forward and the effects of loss offset restrictions are provided. I find that the restrictions on the use of tax loss carryback are rather ineffective while the newly introduced minimum taxation considerably increases yearly tax revenue by 1.1 billion EUR.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.diw.de/en
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John R. Graham & Michael L. Lemmon, 1998. "Measuring Corporate Tax Rates And Tax Incentives: A New Approach," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 11(1), pages 54-65.
- Ramb, Fred, 2007. "Corporate marginal tax rate, tax loss carryforwards and investment functions: empirical analysis using a large German panel data set," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2007,21, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Bradley, Michael & Jarrell, Gregg A & Kim, E Han, 1984. " On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 857-78, July.
- Titman, Sheridan & Wessels, Roberto, 1988. " The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, March.
- Alan J. Auerbach, 1983.
"Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage,"
NBER Working Papers
1151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K, 1990.
" Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1471-93, December.
- Jack M. Mintz, 1987.
"An Empirical Estimate of Corportate Tax Refundability and Effective Tax Rates,"
Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU)
87-02, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Mintz, Jack M, 1988. "An Empirical Estimate of Corporate Tax Refundability and Effective Tax Rates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 225-31, February.
- Cordes, Joseph J & Sheffrin, Steven M, 1983. " Estimating the Tax Advantage of Corporate Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 95-105, March.
- Graham, John R., 1996. "Debt and the marginal tax rate," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 41-73, May.
- Rosanne Altshuler & Alan J. Auerbach, 1987.
"The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation,"
NBER Working Papers
2279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Altshuler, Rosanne & Auerbach, Alan J, 1990. "The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 61-86, February.
- Stefan Bach & Nadja Dwenger, 2007. "Unternehmensbesteuerung: trotz hoher Steuersätze mäßiges Aufkommen," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 74(5), pages 57-65.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp764. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.