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La réglementation de l’audit est-elle dans l’intérêt public:quelques enseignements du modèle français

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Piot

    (Université de Grenoble)

  • Alain Schatt

    (Université de Bourgogne IAE LEG UMR Cnrs 5118)

Abstract

(VF)Cet article s’appuie sur les travaux académiques des dix dernières années pour évaluer les effets de la réglementation française visant à accroître l’indépendance des auditeurs. Pour les sociétés cotées en bourse, l’obligation de recourir à deux auditeurs se solde notamment par une moindre concentration du marché de l’audit : les Big Four détiennent une part de marché plus faible. Pour autant, les honoraires ne sont pas plus faibles, en raison vraisemblablement, d’une part, des coûts de coordination entre les deux auditeurs qui excèdent les bénéfices escomptés résultant d’un marché plus concurrentiel, d’autre part, de l’impossibilité de changer d’auditeur pendant la durée légale de six ans. Par ailleurs, la plus grande indépendance supposée, induite par cette réglementation spécifique, ne se traduit pas par une moindre gestion des résultats par les dirigeants français, malgré l’interdiction de facturer des honoraires de conseil. Ces constats empiriques nous conduisent à avancer que des assouplissements réglementaires du marché de l’audit pourraient s’avérer bénéfiques pour les actionnaires des entreprises françaises.(VA) This paper draws on the growing academic literature, over the last decade, to assess the effects of the French regulation aimed at promoting external auditor independence. For listed companies, the joint-audit requirement results in a less concentrated audit market: Big 4 auditors have a weaker market share as compared with other markets. But audit fees are not lower, however. This could be explained by (1) coordination costs between joint-auditors that outweigh the benefits of a more “open” market, and/or (2) the impossibility to switch auditor during a six-year legal engagement. Elsewhere, the a priori stronger independence associated with that specific regulation does not result in less earnings management activities by French managers, despite of the legal banning of parallel non-audit services. These empirical observations lead us to argue that a less constraining regulation of the audit market could benefit to the shareholders of French companies.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Piot & Alain Schatt, 2010. "La réglementation de l’audit est-elle dans l’intérêt public:quelques enseignements du modèle français," Working Papers CREGO 1100606, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1100606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    audit; réglementation; France; honoraires; gestion des résultats; regulation; audit fees; earnings management.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General

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