Duopoly with Differentiated Products and Entry Barriers
Product differentiated duopoly with a potential entrant facing a single period fixed cost entry barriers is modeled as a noncooperative game. In addition to characterizing the equilibrium solutions and relating them to entry costs and product differentiation, a comparison of price and quantity competition shows that entry conditions are qualitatively sensitive to the strategic variables used in a given industry. Quantity competition appears to be more favorable for entry than price competition. The use of threats and other exclusionary tactics, such as limit pricing, decisively determine the outcome when entry costs are moderate.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1981|
|Publication status:||Published in Southern Economic Journal (1981), 48(1): 179-186|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1971. "Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 306-322, September.
- Levitan, Richard & Shubik, Martin, 1972.
"Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 111-122, February.
- Richard E. Levitan & Martin Shubik, 1970. "Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 287, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)