Bagwell's paradox, forward induction and outside option games
In Stackelberg-like games there is an advantage of moving first. However, Bagwell (1995) shows that this result may not hold if the second player can make only imperfect observations. We explore whether this paradox also holds when the advantage comes from forward induction arguments in the class of outside option games.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- van Damme, Eric, 1989.
"Stable equilibria and forward induction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
- van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
- van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Other publications TiSEM bd598a8f-f017-4cab-a9ed-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we1035. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ana Poveda)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.