The influence of blockholders on R and D investments intensity : evidence from Spain
This article studies the relationship between the presence of large shareholders in the ownership structure of firms and R and D investment. In our analysis, we consider the influence of three types of blockholders: banks, non-financial corporations, and individuals. Moreover, we incorporate an additional feature largely ignored in previous research, namely the number of blockholders. Consistent with our theoretical contention, our results indicate that the impact of large shareholders on the R and D investment is (1) negative when blockholders are banks, (2) positive when blockholders are non- financial corporations, and (3) null when blockholders are individuals. In addition, we find a systematic negative relationship between the number of blockholders and R and D investment. Finally, we contribute to current literature by extending our analysis in two novel ways. First, we test the impact of each blockholder type contingent to the life-cycle stage of firms. Second, we analyze the influence that the combined effect between blockholder type and R and D investment has on the firm's economic performance. Results of these extensions provide relevant implications for policy makers and academic research.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2005|
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