IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/wbrepe/6517.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Costly financial crises

Author

Listed:
  • Samartín, Margarita

Abstract

This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics. As in Allen and Gale [1], bank runs arise endogenously as a consequence of the standard deposit contract in a world with aggregate uncertainty about asset returns. The purpose of the paper is to show that Allen and Gale's result about the optimality of bank runs depends on individuals's preferences. In a more general framework, considered in the present work, a laisse-faire policy can never be optimal, and therefore, regulation is always needed in order to achieve the first best. This result supports the traditional view that bank runs are costly and should be prevented with regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Samartín, Margarita, 1999. "Costly financial crises," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 6517, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:6517
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams/606b23fc-ec95-45f5-a093-358552301a4e/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-592, June.
    3. Gorton, Gary, 1988. "Banking Panics and Business Cycles," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 751-781, December.
    4. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:3:p:749-61 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:4:p:1245-1284 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carletti, Elena & De Marco, Filippo & Ioannidou, Vasso & Sette, Enrico, 2021. "Banks as patient lenders: Evidence from a tax reform," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 6-26.
    2. Rajkamal Iyer & Manju Puri & Nicholas Ryan, 2016. "A Tale of Two Runs: Depositor Responses to Bank Solvency Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(6), pages 2687-2726, December.
    3. Davis, E. Philip & Karim, Dilruba, 2008. "Comparing early warning systems for banking crises," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 89-120, June.
    4. Mihaela Tofan, 2022. "A Regulatory Perspective on the Actual Challenges for the European Deposit Insurance Scheme," Laws, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-13, October.
    5. Raquel de F. Oliveira & Rafael F. Schiozer & Lucas A. B. de C. Barros, 2011. "Too Big to Fail Perception by Depositors: an empirical investigation," Working Papers Series 233, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    6. Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2012. "Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 65(2), pages 580-608, May.
    7. Ebrahimi Kahou, Mahdi & Lehar, Alfred, 2017. "Macroprudential policy: A review," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 92-105.
    8. Acharya, Viral & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2003. "Information Contagion and Inter-Bank Correlation in a Theory of Systemic Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 3743, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Yu Zhang & Xiaosong Zheng, 2016. "A Study of Herd Behavior Based on the Chinese Stock Market," Journal of Applied Management and Investments, Department of Business Administration and Corporate Security, International Humanitarian University, vol. 5(2), pages 131-135, May.
    10. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition and Stability in Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 12, pages 455-502, Central Bank of Chile.
    11. Kristian Blickle & Markus Brunnermeier & Stephan Luck, 2024. "Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(9), pages 2685-2731.
    12. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
    13. Christopher Martin & Manju Puri & Alexander Ufier, 2018. "Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance," NBER Working Papers 24589, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Hubert János Kiss, 2018. "Depositors’ Behaviour in Times of Mass Deposit Withdrawals," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 17(4), pages 95-111.
    15. Samartin, Margarita, 2003. "Should bank runs be prevented?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 977-1000, May.
    16. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    17. Xavier Vives, 2014. "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(12), pages 3547-3592.
    18. Qi Chen & Itay Goldstein & Zeqiong Huang & Rahul Vashishtha, 2024. "Liquidity Transformation and Fragility in the U.S. Banking Sector," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(6), pages 3985-4036, December.
    19. Dwyer Jr., Gerald P. & Samartín, Margarita, 2009. "Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-169, June.
    20. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Gale, Douglas, 2014. "Money, financial stability and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 100-127.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal risk-sharing;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:6517. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ana Poveda (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.business.uc3m.es/es/index .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.