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Relaciones de propiedad cruzadas en mercados oligopolísticos

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  • Moreno, Diego

Abstract

En la teoría clásica del oligopolio, los efectos de la concentración sobre el equilibrio de mercado y el bienestar de consumidores y productores se estudian atendiendo exclusivamente al número y tamaño de las empresas en la industria, e ignorando las relaciones de propiedad entre las mismas. El análisis del modelo de Cournot ampliado para incorporar las relaciones de propiedad revela que la existencia de relaciones cruzadas de propiedad entre las empresas de una misma industria tiene un efecto anticompetitivo significativo sobre el precio, la producción, los beneficios, el excedente y el grado de concentración de una industria, incluso cuando las empresas participadas retienen su independencia operativa. Se propone una modificación del índice de Herfindahl-Hirschman que incorpora las relaciones de propiedad en la industria como determinante del grado de concentración, y que retiene las propiedades y la interpretación del índice estándar.

Suggested Citation

  • Moreno, Diego, 1999. "Relaciones de propiedad cruzadas en mercados oligopolísticos," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE 3894, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:derepe:3894
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Moreno, Diego, 1999. "Competencia vía funciones de oferta en el mercado español de producción de energía eléctrica," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE 3893, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
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