IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/csa/wpaper/2026-03.html

Natural Resources and the Public’s Political Trust

Author

Listed:
  • Patricia Agyapong

Abstract

Do natural resources affect public trust in political leaders and institutions? In this study, I use a difference-in-differences approach to investigate this question, focusing on Ghana’s discovery of high-grade offshore oil in 2007. I find that individuals living close to the oil fields became less trusting of political leaders and institutions after the discovery. The findings suggest that the oil discovery’s impact on political trust varies depending on pre-existing social and economic condi¬tions such as educational status, employment status and the level of media exposure. Additionally, individuals located near the oil fields reported more negative views about Ghana’s democracy, corruption, government performance, and economic conditions. The results suggest a potential link between increased bribe payments in these locations and declining trust.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Agyapong, 2026. "Natural Resources and the Public’s Political Trust," CSAE Working Paper Series 2026-03, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  • Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2026-03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9788d227-f8bd-4cd6-866a-fb1befa3f84c
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Carlos A Leite & Jens Weidmann, 1999. "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth," IMF Working Papers 1999/085, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
    3. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451.
    4. Arezki, Rabah & Brückner, Markus, 2011. "Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 955-963.
    5. Al-Ubaydli, Omar, 2012. "Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 137-152.
    6. Salari, Mahmoud & Noghanibehambari, Hamid, 2021. "Natural resources, women and corruption," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    7. Carl Henrik Knutsen & Andreas Kotsadam & Eivind Hammersmark Olsen & Tore Wig, 2017. "Mining and Local Corruption in Africa," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 320-334, April.
    8. Jing Vivian Zhan, 2017. "Do Natural Resources Breed Corruption? Evidence from China," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(2), pages 237-259, February.
    9. Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Hodler, Roland, 2010. "Natural resources, democracy and corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 608-621, May.
    10. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2012. "Testing The Pearl Hypothesis: Natural resources and trust," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 358-367.
    11. Miller, Rebecca, 2015. "Natural resource extraction and political trust," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 165-172.
    12. Leonard Wantchekon, 2002. "Why do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?," Journal of African Development, African Finance and Economic Association (AFEA), vol. 5(2), pages 145-176.
    13. Haber, Stephen & Menaldo, Victor, 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-26, February.
    14. Matthias Busse & Steffen Gröning, 2013. "The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 1-20, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mavisakalyan, Astghik & Minasyan, Anna, 2025. "Mining and mistrust in government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    2. Hong, Ji Yeon & Yang, Wenhui, 2024. "How Natural Resources Affect Corruption in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    3. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2023. "Can resource windfalls reduce corruption? The role of term limits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    4. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge & Mmari, Donald & Sjursen, Ingrid Hoem & Tungodden, Bertil, 2021. "Understanding the resource curse: A large-scale experiment on corruption in Tanzania," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 129-157.
    5. Carl Henrik Knutsen & Andreas Kotsadam & Eivind Hammersmark Olsen & Tore Wig, 2017. "Mining and Local Corruption in Africa," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 320-334, April.
    6. Alssadek, Marwan & Benhin, James, 2023. "Natural resource curse: A literature survey and comparative assessment of regional groupings of oil-rich countries," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    7. Jeffrey Frankel, 2012. "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions," Growth Lab Working Papers 36, Harvard's Growth Lab.
    8. Bürgi Bonanomi, Elisabeth & Elsig, Manfred & Espa, Ilaria, 2015. "The Commodity Sector and Related Governance Challenges from a Sustainable Development Perspective: The Example of Switzerland Current Research Gaps," Papers 865, World Trade Institute.
    9. James, Alexander, 2019. "Fata morganas in oil-rich, institution-poor economies," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 234-242.
    10. Ruba A. Aljarallah & Andrew Angus, 2020. "Dilemma of Natural Resource Abundance: A Case Study of Kuwait," SAGE Open, , vol. 10(1), pages 21582440198, January.
    11. Piman Alain-Raphaël BAYILI & Windkouni Haoua Eugénie MAIGA, 2025. "Does dependence on natural resource rents reduce the quality of institutions in Africa?," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 61, pages 71-95.
    12. Ayushi Choudhary & Rupayan Pal, 2025. "Quota regulation under corruption - Grand, petty and the cut-money culture," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2025-017, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    13. Cockx, Lara & Francken, Nathalie, 2016. "Natural resources: A curse on education spending?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 394-408.
    14. Kaznacheev, Peter, 2013. "Resource Rents and Economic Growth: Economic and institutional development in countries with a high share of income from the sale of natural resources. Analysis and recommendations based on international experience," EconStor Research Reports 121950, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    15. Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder & Monir Uddin Ahmed, 2023. "Does natural resource abundance breed corruption? The role of political institutions," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(9), pages 1-43, September.
    16. Imelda, Foudjo Suzie & Nabil Aman, Ndikeu Njoya & Joseph, Keneck-Massil, 2024. "Do natural resources influence E-government in developing countries? Effects and transmission channels," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    17. Miller, Rebecca, 2015. "Natural resource extraction and political trust," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 165-172.
    18. James, Alexander & Rivera, Nathaly M., 2022. "Oil, politics, and “Corrupt Bastards”," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    19. Boschini, Anne & Pettersson, Jan & Roine, Jesper, 2013. "The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-41.
    20. Laszlo Szalai, 2018. "Institutions and Resource-driven Development," World Journal of Applied Economics, WERI-World Economic Research Institute, vol. 4(1), pages 39-53, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • Q33 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Resource Booms (Dutch Disease)
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2026-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Julia Coffey (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csaoxuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.