International Vertical Specializations, Imperfect Competition and Welfare
This Paper looks at the impact of international vertical specialization when the final good industry is imperfectly competitive. Final goods are assembled out of different fragments. In the absence of international vertical specialization all fragments required to produce a given final good must be produced in the same country. International vertical specialization unambiguously reduces the costs of production of all final good producers, albeit not necessarily in the same proportion. If the cost of production of a less efficient producer is reduced to a lesser extent than that of a more efficient producer, vertical specialization may lead to exit in the final good industry. This anti-competitive effect may be strong enough that international vertical specialization leads to a Pareto inferior outcome. On the other hand, we can characterize two sets of policies, which, combined with vertical specialization, are Pareto improving compared to autarky regardless of consumer preferences and of the form of competition in the final good industry.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Masahisa Fujita & Jacques-François Thisse, 2006.
"Globalization And The Evolution Of The Supply Chain: Who Gains And Who Loses?,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 811-836, 08.
- FUJITA, Masahisa & THISSE, Jacques-François, "undated". "Globalisation and the evolution of the supply chain: who gains and who loses?," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1968, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Fujita, Masahisa & Thisse, Jacques-François, 2003. "Globalization and the Evolution of the Supply Chain: Who Gains and Who Loses?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Masahisa Fujita & Jacques-François Thisse, 2006. "Globalization and the evoluton of the supply chain: WHO gains and who loses?," Post-Print halshs-00754139, HAL.
- Fujita, Masahisa & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 2004. "Globalization and the Evolution of the Supply Chain: who gains and who loses?," IDE Discussion Papers 5, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
- Masahisa Fujita & Jacques-Francois Thisse, 2003. "Globalization and the Evolution of the Supply Chain: who gains and who loses?," KIER Working Papers 571, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- FUJITA, Masahisa & THISSE, Jacques, 2003. "Globalization and the evolution of the supply chain: who gains and who loses ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2003074, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chen, Yongmin & Ishikawa, Jota & Yu, Zhihao, 2004. "Trade liberalization and strategic outsourcing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 419-436, July.
- Chen, Yongmin & Ishikawa, Jota & Yu, Zhihao, 2001. "Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing," Discussion Papers 2001-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yongmin Chen & Jota Ishikawa & Zhihao Yu, 2002. "Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing," Carleton Economic Papers 02-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2004.
- Francois, Patrick & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2002. "On the protection of cultural goods," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 359-369, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4311. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.