A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-91 suggest that influence activities were, indeed, significant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments. Moreover, we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel and when imposing an exogenous preference for convergence in regional productivity levels.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993.
"Protection for Sale,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Alicia H. Munnell, 1990.
"How does public infrastructure affect regional economic performance?,"
Conference Series ; [Proceedings],
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 34, pages 69-112.
- Alicia H. Munnell & Leah M. Cook, 1990. "How does public infrastructure affect regional economic performance?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 11-33.
- Negishi, Takashi, 1973. "The excess of public expenditures on industries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 231-240, July.
- White, Kenneth J, 1992. "The Durbin-Watson Test for Autocorrelation in Nonlinear Models," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(2), pages 370-73, May.
- Martin, Philippe, 1999.
"Public policies, regional inequalities and growth,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 85-105, July.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
- Randall W. Eberts, 1990. "Public infrastructure and regional economic development," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 15-27.
- David Aschauer, 1988.
"Is public expenditure productive?,"
88-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Martin, Philippe & Rogers, Carol Ann, 1994.
"Industrial Location and Public Infrastructure,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
909, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert Eisner, 1991. "Infrastructure and regional economic performance: comment," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 47-58.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- Gramlich, Edward M, 1994. "Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 1176-96, September.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1998.
"Dynamic Common Agency,"
1259, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alicia H. Munnell, 1990. "Why has productivity growth declined? Productivity and public investment," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 3-22.
- Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Optimality rules for the provision of collective factors of production," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 149-157, April.
- Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, 1994. "Public-Sector Capital and the Productivity Puzzle," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(1), pages 12-21, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2336. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct email address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.