Tax administration and compliance: evidence from medieval Paris
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More about this item
Keywordscompliance; evasion; Fairness; institutions; middle ages; Paris; taxation;
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2019-02-25 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-HIS-2019-02-25 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-IUE-2019-02-25 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2019-02-25 (Public Economics)
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