Myths and Numbers on Whistleblower Rewards
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References listed on IDEAS
- Stikeleather, Bryan R., 2016. "When do employers benefit from offering workers a financial reward for reporting internal misconduct?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1-14.
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; Financial incentives; fraud; law enforcement; retaliation; tax evasion; whistleblower protection; Whistleblower rewards;
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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