IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/12957.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Myths and Numbers on Whistleblower Rewards

Author

Listed:
  • Nyrerod, Theo
  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo

Abstract

Whistleblower rewards have been used extensively in the US to limit procurement fraud and tax evasion, and their use has been extended to fight financial fraud after the recent financial crisis. There is currently a debate on their possible introduction in Europe, but authorities there appear considerably less enthusiastic than their US counterparts. While it is important that these tools are scrutinized in a lively democratic debate, many things have been written - even by important institutional players - that have no empirical backing or that are in open contrast to the available evidence from independent research. In this paper we review some of the most debated issues regarding the potential benefits and costs of financial incentives for whistleblowers, while trying to separate existing evidence from conjectures with no empirical support, and myths in contrast to available evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Nyrerod, Theo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2018. "Myths and Numbers on Whistleblower Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 12957, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12957
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12957
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stikeleather, Bryan R., 2016. "When do employers benefit from offering workers a financial reward for reporting internal misconduct?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1-14.
    2. Abbink, Klaus & Wu, Kevin, 2017. "Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-272.
    3. Jeffrey V. Butler & Danila Serra & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017. "Motivating Whistleblowers," Departmental Working Papers 1701, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    4. Perrotta Berlin, Maria & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Qin, Bei, 2015. "Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China," SITE Working Paper Series 34, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 25 May 2017.
    5. Paolo Buccirossi & Giovanni Immordino & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017. "Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud," CSEF Working Papers 477, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 02 Sep 2017.
    6. Call, Andrew C. & Kedia, Simi & Rajgopal, Shivaram, 2016. "Rank and file employees and the discovery of misreporting: The role of stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 277-300.
    7. Maria Bigoni & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Chloé Le Coq & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012. "fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(2), pages 368-390, June.
    8. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Yehonatan Givati, 2016. "A Theory of Whistleblower Rewards," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 43-72.
    10. Nathan H. Miller, 2009. "Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 750-768, June.
    11. repec:wly:coacre:v:34:y:2017:i:3:p:1305-1339 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Financial incentives; fraud; law enforcement; retaliation; tax evasion; whistleblower protection; Whistleblower rewards;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12957. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.