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Socialist incentive schemes and price planning

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  • Benard, Jean

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  • Benard, Jean, 1987. "Socialist incentive schemes and price planning," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8735, CEPREMAP.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8735
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    File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co8735.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1982. "Design of incentive schemes and the new Soviet Incentive model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 127-148.
    2. Martin L. Weitzman, 1976. "The New Soviet Incentive Model," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 251-257, Spring.
    3. Mo-Yin S. Tam, 1981. "Reward Structures in a Planned Economy: The Problem of Incentives and Efficient Allocation of Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 96(1), pages 111-128.
    4. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    5. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    6. JÖrg Finsinger & Ingo Vogelsa, 1981. "Alternative Institutional Frameworks For Price Incentive Mechanisms," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 388-404, August.
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