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Fiscal policy in a growth model with bequest-as-consumption

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  • MICHEL, Philippe
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper analyses a growth model wherein saving results from bequestas-consumption. It first looks at the market equilibrium and at the optimal solution. Then it turns to the issue of decentralizing the optimal solution with various taxes and transfers. Depending on the available instruments, either a first-best or a second-best optimum can be achieved. Throughout the paper the results are contrasted with those obtained in the standard altruistic (dynastic) model and in the overlapping generation model without intergenerational transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2001. "Fiscal policy in a growth model with bequest-as-consumption," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Masson, A. & Pestieau, P., 1996. "Bequests motives and models of inheritance: a survey of the literature," DELTA Working Papers 96-20, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    3. Atkinson, A B & Sandmo, A, 1980. "Welfare Implications of the Taxation of Savings," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(359), pages 529-549, September.
    4. Louis Kaplow, 2000. "A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation," NBER Working Papers 7775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. MICHEL, Ph. & PESTIEAU, P., 1998. "Fiscal policy in a growth model with both altruistic and nonaltruistic agents," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1301, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-622, May.
    7. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 818-834, August.
    8. Philippe Michel & Pierre Pestieau, 1999. "Fiscal Policy when Individuals Differ with Regard to Altruism and Labor Supply," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 187-203, April.
    9. Philippe Michel & Pierre Pestieau, 1998. "Fiscal Policy in a Growth Model with Both Altruistic and Nonaltruistic Agents," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(3), pages 682-697, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Johann K. Brunner, 2010. "Die Erbschaftssteuer im Modell der optimalen Besteuerung," Economics working papers 2010-14, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    2. Philippe Michel & Pierre Pestieau, 2004. "Fiscal Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model with Bequest‐as‐Consumption," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 397-407, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bequests; fiscal policy; optimal growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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