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Synfuels: Justifications for and Consequences of Government Intervention

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  • Lawrence H. Goulder

    (Harvard University)

  • Marc S. Robinson

    (UCLA)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence H. Goulder & Marc S. Robinson, 1982. "Synfuels: Justifications for and Consequences of Government Intervention," UCLA Economics Working Papers 272, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:272
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp272.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baumol, William J & Wolff, Edward N, 1981. "Subsidies to New Energy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 891-913, October.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-661, September.
    3. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters,in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. James L. Sweeney, 1977. "Economics of Depletable Resources: Market Forces and Intertemporal Bias," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 125-141.
    5. Partha Dasgupta & Richard J. Gilbert & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "Invention and Innovation Under Alternative Market Structures: The Case of Natural Resources," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 567-582.
    6. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    7. E. Maskin & D. Newbery, 1978. "Rational Expectations With Market Power: The Paradox of the Disadvantageous Tariff," Working papers 227, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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