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Taxing and Subsidizing Foreign Investors

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Abstract

Many countries impose taxes on foreign investors while also having in place targeted subsidies and tax incentives that are designed to attract them. This paper shows that such a policy can be optimal from the standpoint of a host country. The government has an incentive to tax inframarginal firms because they are relatively immobile. It also has an incentive to subsidize marginal firms because the economic activity generated by such a subsidy can increase domestic wages in excess of the fiscal cost of the subsidy. These tax and subsidy policies improve host country welfare at the expense of foreigners. This analysis is thus able to provide an explanation for why tax coordination efforts can simultaneously entail reduced taxes and subsidies on foreign firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Sharma, Rishi, 2016. "Taxing and Subsidizing Foreign Investors," Working Papers 2016-03, Department of Economics, Colgate University, revised 25 May 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgt:wpaper:2016-03
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    Cited by:

    1. Rishi R. Sharma, 2019. "Incentives to tax foreign investors," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(2), pages 257-281, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international taxation; foreign direct investment; firm heterogeneity; tax competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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