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Downstream market structure and the incentive for innovation in telecommunication infrastructure

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  • Nina Czernich

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how the competitive situation in the downstream market, the services, and the innovative activity in the upstream market, the network infrastructure, interact. The focus is on the vertical structure of the telecommunication market, which is analysed in the framework of a patent licensing model. The paper considers an integrated network provider who can implement a new technology for the network which reduces the costs of offering services over the network. This provider can charge a mark-up above the new lower cost level from the service providers for the use of the new technology. The level of the mark-up is determined by a regulator who aims at promoting innovation. It can be shown that the network provider’s incentive to innovate increases with the number of competitors, given that the mark-up is sufficiently high. Hence, there exists a range for the mark-up where increasing competition in the service market and more innovative investment in the network infrastructure can be achieved simultaneously.

Suggested Citation

  • Nina Czernich, 2008. "Downstream market structure and the incentive for innovation in telecommunication infrastructure," ifo Working Paper Series 64, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_64
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    File URL: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/IfoWorkingPaper-64.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
    2. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 567-589.
    3. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
    4. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347-347.
    5. Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 2002. "Patent Licensing: The Inside Story," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(1), pages 7-15, January.
    6. Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354, Elsevier.
    7. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nina Czernich, 2011. "The emergence of broadband internet and consequences for economic and social development," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 37.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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