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Transfer Pricing and Partial Tax Harmonization

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfgang Eggert
  • Gideon Goerdt
  • Sebastian Felix Heitzmann

Abstract

This paper investigates regulation on corporate income taxation with multinationals and transfer pricing. We recommend full cooperation within the EU if profit shifting costs are sufficiently low and cannot be influenced to a large extend. Otherwise, high profit shifting costs or the potential to significantly influence them imply that partial cooperation is beneficial for all member states.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Eggert & Gideon Goerdt & Sebastian Felix Heitzmann, 2018. "Transfer Pricing and Partial Tax Harmonization," CESifo Working Paper Series 6875, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6875
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax harmonization; transfer pricing; multinational; profit shifting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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