Analyzing a Flat Income Tax in the Netherlands
A flat tax rate on income has gained popularity in European countries. This paper assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the least cost to labour market performance. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms, matching frictions, and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. This finding bolsters the notion that a linear tax is less efficient than a non-linear tax to obtain redistributive goals.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich|
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo-group.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
- Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983.
"Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April.
- Michael J. Boskin & Eytan Sheshinski, 1979. "Optimal Tax Treatment of the Family: Married Couples," NBER Working Papers 0368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Diamond, Peter A, 1998.
"Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March.
- Diamond, P., 1994. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Exemple with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," Working papers 94-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Bovenberg, A. Lans & Graafland, Johan J. & de Mooij, Ruud A., 2000.
"Tax reform and the Dutch labor market: an applied general equilibrium approach,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 193-214, October.
- Bovenberg, A Lans & de Mooij, Ruud A & Graafland, Johan J, 1998. "Tax Reform and the Dutch Labour Market: An Applied General Equilibrium Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 1983, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bovenberg, A.L. & Graafland, J.J. & de Mooij, R.A., 2000. "Tax reform and the Dutch labour market : An applied general equilibrium approach," Other publications TiSEM a22f887a-ce1a-4aa2-ad01-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- A. Lans Bovenberg & Johan J. Graafland & Ruud A. de Mooij, 1998. "Tax Reform and the Dutch Labor Market: An Applied General Equilibrium Approach," NBER Working Papers 6693, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ricardo Varsano & Kevin Kim & Michael Keen, 2006. "The "Flat Tax(es)"; Principles and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/218, International Monetary Fund.
- Tuomala, Matti, 1990. "Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198286059, December.
- Lans Bovenberg, A. & Jacobs, Bas, 2005.
"Redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese twins,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2005-2035, December.
- Bovenberg, A Lans & Jacobs, Bas, 2001. "Redistribution and Education Subsidies are Siamese Twins," CEPR Discussion Papers 3099, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bovenberg, A.L. & Jacobs, B., 2001. "Redistribution and Education Subsidies are Siamese Twins," Discussion Paper 2001-82, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- van Ewijk, Casper & Tang, Paul J.G., 2007. "Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1119-1139, December.
- A. Lans Bovenberg & Bas Jacobs, 2005. "Redistribution and Education Subsidies are Siamese Twins," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-036/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Bas Jacobs, 2005. "Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Human Capital," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 295-315, 05.
- Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073.
- Michiel Evers & Ruud A. De Mooij & Daniel J. Van Vuuren, 2005.
"What Explains the Variation in Estimates of Labour Supply Elasticities?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1633, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michiel Evers & Ruud de Mooij & Daniel van Vuuren, 2005. "What explains the variation in estimates of labour supply elasticities?," CPB Discussion Paper 51, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Michiel Evers & Ruud A. de Mooij & Daniel J. van Vuuren, 2006. "What explains the Variation in Estimates of Labour Supply Elasticities?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-017/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Emmanuel Saez, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 205-229.
- Graafland, J.J. & Huizinga, F.H., 1998. "Taxes and benefits in a non-linear wage equation," MPRA Paper 21076, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Seade, J. K., 1977. "On the shape of optimal tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 203-235, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1890. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.