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Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements

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  • Jay Pil Choi

Abstract

Tying arrangements recently have been a major and contentious issue in many high profile antitrust cases in the US and Europe. Examples include the Microsoft case, the Visa and MasterCard case, and the proposed GE/Honeywell merger to name a few. This paper conducts a selective review of the recent developments in the analysis of tying arrangements. It also discusses relevant antitrust cases concerned with tying arrangements in light of recent theoretical advances in this area.

Suggested Citation

  • Jay Pil Choi, 2004. "Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements," CESifo Working Paper Series 1336, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1336
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1336.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mark Armstrong, 2006. "Competition in two‐sided markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, September.
    2. Jay Pil Choi, 2004. "Tying and innovation: A dynamic analysis of tying arrangements," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 83-101, January.
    3. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-328, Summer.
    4. Carbajo, Jose & de Meza, David & Seidmann, Daniel J, 1990. "A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 283-298, March.
    5. Jay Pil Choi, 1996. "Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation, and the "Leverage Theory"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1153-1181.
    6. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, June.
    7. Lewbel, Arthur, 1985. "Bundling of substitutes or complements," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-107, March.
    8. Chen, Yongmin, 1997. "Equilibrium Product Bundling," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(1), pages 85-103, January.
    9. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arribas, I. & Urbano, A., 2017. "Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 14-38.
    2. Amelio, Andrea & Jullien, Bruno, 2012. "Tying and freebies in two-sided markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 436-446.
    3. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2009. "Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling," IDEI Working Papers 574, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jul 2011.
    4. Gans, Joshua S., 2011. "Remedies for tying in computer applications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 505-512, September.
    5. Begoña Garcia Mariñoso & Xavier Martínez-Giralt & Pau Olivella, 2008. "Bundling in Telecommunications," Working Papers 356, Barcelona School of Economics.

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