IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cep/cepops/34.html

Extreme Wage Inequality: Pay at the Very Top

Author

Listed:
  • Brian Bell
  • John Van Reenen

Abstract

We provide new evidence on the growth in pay at the very top of the wage distribution in the UK. Sectoral decompositions show that workers in the financial sector have accounted for the majority of the gains at the top over the last decade. New results are also presented on the pay of CEOs in the UK. We show how improved measurement of pay points to a stronger pay-performance link than previously estimated. This link is stronger, and more symmetric, for those firms in which institutional investors play a larger role.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Bell & John Van Reenen, 2013. "Extreme Wage Inequality: Pay at the Very Top," CEP Occasional Papers 34, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:cepops:34
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/occasional/op034.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, 2010. "Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(3), pages 1004-1050, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Campbell, Douglas L. & Lusher, Lester, 2019. "The impact of real exchange rate shocks on manufacturing workers: An autopsy from the MORG," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 12-28.
    2. Charles Ka Yui Leung & Joe Cho Yiu Ng & Edward Tang, 2020. "Why is the Hong Kong Housing Market Unaffordable? Some Stylized Facts and Estimations," Globalization Institute Working Papers 380, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    3. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    4. Anthony B. Atkinson & Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "Top Incomes in the Long Run of History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-71, March.
    5. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Kuhnen, Camelia M., 2013. "CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 351-372.
    6. Marin, Giovanni & Vona, Francesco, 2023. "Finance and the reallocation of scientific, engineering and mathematical talent," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(5).
    7. Ahmed, Shaker & Ranta, Mikko & Vähämaa, Emilia & Vähämaa, Sami, 2023. "Facial attractiveness and CEO compensation: Evidence from the banking industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    8. Andreas Kuhn, 2017. "International Evidence on the Perception and Normative Valuation of Executive Compensation," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 55(1), pages 112-136, March.
    9. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2015. "Wall Street occupations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Dong, Feng & Jia, Yandong & Wang, Siqing, 2022. "Speculative Bubbles and Talent Misallocation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    11. Michael Böhm & Daniel Metzger & Per Strömberg, 2022. "“Since You’re So Rich, You Must Be Really Smart”: Talent, Rent Sharing, and the Finance Wage Premium," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 147, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    12. Asano, Koji, 2024. "Managing financial expertise," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(PA), pages 351-365.
    13. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S. & Wang, Wei, 2016. "How costly is corporate bankruptcy for the CEO?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 210-229.
    15. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
    16. Jesse Bricker & Alice Henriques & Jacob Krimmel & John Sabelhaus, 2016. "Measuring Income and Wealth at the Top Using Administrative and Survey Data," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 47(1 (Spring), pages 261-331.
    17. Peter Hoeller, 2012. "Less Income Inequality and More Growth – Are they Compatible? Part 4. Top Incomes," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 927, OECD Publishing.
    18. Antonio Falato & Dan Li & Todd T. Milbourn, 2012. "CEO pay and the market for CEOs," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-39, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    19. Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, 2007. "Skill Biased Financial Development: Education, Wages and Occupations in the U.S. Financial Sector," NBER Working Papers 13437, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Akram, Farheen & Abrar ul haq, Muhammad, 2018. "Assessing the Effect of Managerial Power on Firm Performance through the Perceptual Lens of Executive Remuneration," MPRA Paper 100050, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2019.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cep:cepops:34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/occasional-papers/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.