The Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Clustering
Clustering methods group individuals or objects based on information about their similarity or proximity. When the raw information to generate the clusters cannot be easily observed or verified, the clusters designer must rely on information reported on individuals behind the observations. When individuals receive utility from a public decision taken with aggregated data within each own's cluster and have single-peaked preferences, we prove that there do not exist cluster methods such that truth-revealing behavior is always a dominant strategy.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: c/ Bailén 50. 41001 Sevilla|
Phone: (34) 955 055 210
Fax: (34) 955 055 211
Web page: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541.
- Brams, S. J. & Jones, M. A. & Kilgour, M. D., 2001.
"Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions,"
01-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Susana Mérida)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.