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Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Forbearance and Economic Growth: Implications for the Japanese Banking Crisis

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  • Dekle, Robert
  • Kletzer, Kenneth

Abstract

An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation is used to show how public deposit insurance and weak prudential regulation can lead to banking crises and permanent declines in economic growth. The impact of regulatory forbearance on investment, saving and asset price dynamics under perfect foresight are derived in the model. The assumptions of the theoretical model are based on essential features of the Japanese financial system and its regulation. The model demonstrates how banking and growth crises can evolve under perfect foresight. The dynamics for economic aggregates and asset prices predicted by the model are shown to be generally consistent with the experience of the Japanese economy and financial system through the 1990s. We also test our maintained hypothesis of rational expectations using asset price data for Japan over the 1980s and 1990s. An implication of our analysis is that delaying the resolution of banking crises adversely affects future economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Dekle, Robert & Kletzer, Kenneth, 2004. "Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Forbearance and Economic Growth: Implications for the Japanese Banking Crisis," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt60p0n8mq, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt60p0n8mq
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, 2000. "The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come From and How Will It End?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14, pages 129-212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Robert Dekle & Kenneth Kletzer, 2002. "Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises: Theory and Empirical Evidence from East Asia," NBER Chapters, in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 507-558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ogawa, K. & Kitasaka, S.-I., 2000. "Bank Lending in Japan: its Determinants and Macroeconomic Implications," ISER Discussion Paper 0505, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    4. Dekle, Robert & Kletzer, Kenneth, 2003. "The Japanese banking crisis and economic growth: Theoretical and empirical implications of deposit guarantees and weak financial regulation," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 305-335, September.
    5. Barseghyan, Levon, 2010. "Non-performing loans, prospective bailouts, and Japan's slowdown," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(7), pages 873-890, October.
    6. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    7. Dekle, Robert & Kletzer, Kenneth, 2003. "The Japanese Banking Crisis and Economic Growth: Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Deposit Guarantees and Weak Financial Regulation," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt0t6321ds, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    8. Thomas F. Cargill & Michael M. Hutchison & Takatoshi Ito, 1997. "The Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262032473, December.
    9. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
    10. repec:cdl:ucscec:qt0t6321ds is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Menzie D. Chinn & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000. "International Capital Inflows, Domestic Financial Intermediation and Financial Crises under Imperfect Information," NBER Working Papers 7902, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    13. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    14. Robert Dekle & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2002. "Financial intermediation, agency and collateral and the dynamics of banking crises: theory and evidence for the Japanese banking crisis," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue sep.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hyosoon Choi & Wook Sohn, 2014. "Regulatory Forbearance And Depositor Market Discipline: Evidence From Savings Banks In Korea," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(1), pages 203-218, January.
    2. Stephen Millard & Anamaria Nicolae, 2014. "The effect of the financial crisis on TFP growth: a general equilibrium approach," Bank of England working papers 502, Bank of England.

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