Bargaining With Set-Valued Disagreement
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- Kaushik Basu, 1996. "Bargaining with set-valued disagreement," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 61-74, January.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Bishwanath Goldar & Badal Mukherji, 1998. "Pollution Abatement Cost Function: Methodological And Estimation Issues," Working papers 56, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- KIbrIs, Özgür & TapkI, Ipek Gürsel, 2010. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 233-241, January.
- Kıbrıs, Özgür & Tapkı, İpek Gürsel, 2011. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 151-161.
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