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Game Theory: Parts I and II. Open access book

Author

Listed:
  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

This is a draft of the first half of an open access textbook on game theory. I hope to complete the entire book by the end of 2015. After teaching game theory (at both the undergraduate and graduate level) at the University of California, Davis for 25 years, I decided to organize all my teaching material in a textbook. There are many excellent textbooks in game theory and there is hardly any need for a new one. However, there are two distinguishing features of this textbook: (1) it is open access and thus free, and (2) it contains an unusually large number of exercises (88 for the first half of the book) with complete and detailed answers.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2015. "Game Theory: Parts I and II. Open access book," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:124
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/5f2BCgy4hky7mmKzP1Qun8ig/15-2.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moritz Gerstung & Hani Nakhoul & Niko Beerenwinkel, 2011. "Evolutionary Games with Affine Fitness Functions: Applications to Cancer," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 370-385, September.
    2. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    3. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. György Szabó & Balázs Király, 2021. "General features of Nash equilibria in combinations of elementary interactions in symmetric two-person games," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 94(5), pages 1-9, May.

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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