IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

European Fiscal Compact in Action: Can Independent Fiscal Institutions Deliver Effective Oversight?


  • Michal Horvath

    () (Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York)


The paper explores if EU independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) are in a position to exercise effective scrutiny over national fiscal policies. It identifies substantial heterogeneity across IFIs in resources which is not matched by a similar diversity in mandates, and highlights the role of local ownership as a potentially important factor in explaining this. In addition to financial and human resources, better access to information, effective comply-or-explain mechanisms and closer links with legislatures could enhance fiscal scrutiny and accountability in the EU. The paper provides rankings of individual IFIs constructed based on measures that quantitatively aggregate these pre-conditions for effective fiscal scrutiny.

Suggested Citation

  • Michal Horvath, 2017. "European Fiscal Compact in Action: Can Independent Fiscal Institutions Deliver Effective Oversight?," Discussion Papers Discussion Paper No. 1/20, Council for Budget Responsibility.
  • Handle: RePEc:cbe:dpaper:201701

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Burret, Heiko T. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2014. "Implementation of the fiscal compact in the Euro area member states: Expertise on the behalf of the German Council of Economic Experts," Working Papers 08/2013e, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    2. Kukk Merike & Staehr Karsten, 2015. "Enhanced Fiscal Governance in the European Union: The Fiscal Compact," Baltic Journal of European Studies, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 73-92, February.
    3. Nerlich, Carolin & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2013. "The design of national fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact," Working Paper Series 1588, European Central Bank.
    4. Graham Bird & Alex Mandilaras, 2013. "Fiscal imbalances and output crises in Europe: will the fiscal compact help or hinder?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 1-16, March.
    5. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Faia, Ester, 2014. "The fiscal compact and government debt: One law, multiple statistics," SAFE Policy Letters 22, Goethe University Frankfurt, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Debrun, Xavier, 2019. "Independent Fiscal Institutions in the European Union: Is Coordination Required?," MPRA Paper 93143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Asatryan, Zareh & Debrun, Xavier & Heinemann, Friedrich & Horvath, Michal & Ódor, Ľudovít & Yeter, Mustafa, 2017. "Making the most of the European Fiscal Board," ZEW policy briefs 3/2017, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    More about this item


    Fiscal Compact; European Union; fiscal councils; fiscal policy; democracy;

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cbe:dpaper:201701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.