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Stay, Split or Overthrow: Theory and Evidence on Secessionist vs Centrist Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Esteban, J.
  • Flamand, S.
  • Morelli, M.
  • Rohner, D.

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple model aimed at predicting under what conditions on fundamentals one should expect that a conflict, conditional on occurring, takes the form of a secessionist conflict or centrist conflict. We show that the relative group size of the involved opposition group, the relative intensity of perceived cultural differences, and the time discount factor, all affect the relative likelihood of secessionist conflict over centrist conflict in a clear manner, leading to testable pre-dictions supported by the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Esteban, J. & Flamand, S. & Morelli, M. & Rohner, D., 2026. "Stay, Split or Overthrow: Theory and Evidence on Secessionist vs Centrist Conflict," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2621, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2621
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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