Determining the optimal length of regulatory guarantee: A Length-of-Contract Auction
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- Thomas Greve & Michael G. Pollitt, 2017. "Determining the Optimal Length of Regulatory Guarantee: A Length‐of‐contract Auction," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 325-333, October.
- Thomas Greve & Michael G. Pollitt, 2013. "Determining the optimal length of regulatory guarantee: A Length-of-Contract Auction," Working Papers EPRG 1325, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
References listed on IDEAS
- Paul Klemperer, 2010.
"The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 526-536, 04-05.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 7395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 1997. "Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 68-72, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Greve, Thomas & Teng, Fei & Pollitt, Michael G. & Strbac, Goran, 2018.
"A system operator’s utility function for the frequency response market,"
Elsevier, vol. 231(C), pages 562-569.
- Greve, T. & Teng, F. & Pollitt, M. & Strbac, G., 2017. "A system operator's utility function for the frequency response market," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1728, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Thomas Greve & Fei Teng & Michael Pollitt & Goran Strbac, 2017. "A system operator's utility function for the frequency response market," Working Papers EPRG 1713, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; Contracts; Investments; Regulation Classification JEL: D44; D86; E43;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ENE-2013-12-06 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2013-12-06 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-REG-2013-12-06 (Regulation)
- NEP-TRE-2013-12-06 (Transport Economics)
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