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Asignación de riesgos en concesiones viales: evaluación de la aplicación de mecanismos de mitigación de riesgos en contratos de concesión en Uruguay


  • Andres Pereyra

    () (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)


In infrastructure franchising, risks must be allocated to the agent that can handle them. To mitigate risks that the concessionaire can not handle with should decrease the return required by the concessionaire and increase the expected return of the Government. In this paper we analyze a particular franchise contract in Uruguay, and we try to measure those effects when risks are mitigated. We use simulation techniques, using different hypothesis about the way risk averse agents take decisions under uncertainty. In the case we analyze, the impact of mitigating risks of the concessionaire diminish its expected result in about 40%, although the expected result of the Government increase in a no significant way.

Suggested Citation

  • Andres Pereyra, 2008. "Asignación de riesgos en concesiones viales: evaluación de la aplicación de mecanismos de mitigación de riesgos en contratos de concesión en Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 2008, Department of Economics - dECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:2008

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Natalia Melgar & Máximo Rossi & Tom W. Smith, 2008. "The perception of corruption," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0508, Department of Economics - dECON.
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    More about this item


    corruption; public opinion; role of government; government policy; regulation.;

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures


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