IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ude/wpaper/2008.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Asignación de riesgos en concesiones viales: evaluación de la aplicación de mecanismos de mitigación de riesgos en contratos de concesión en Uruguay

Author

Listed:
  • Andres Pereyra

    (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

Abstract

In infrastructure franchising, risks must be allocated to the agent that can handle them. To mitigate risks that the concessionaire can not handle with should decrease the return required by the concessionaire and increase the expected return of the Government. In this paper we analyze a particular franchise contract in Uruguay, and we try to measure those effects when risks are mitigated. We use simulation techniques, using different hypothesis about the way risk averse agents take decisions under uncertainty. In the case we analyze, the impact of mitigating risks of the concessionaire diminish its expected result in about 40%, although the expected result of the Government increase in a no significant way.

Suggested Citation

  • Andres Pereyra, 2008. "Asignación de riesgos en concesiones viales: evaluación de la aplicación de mecanismos de mitigación de riesgos en contratos de concesión en Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 2008, Department of Economics - dECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:2008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/2114
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 1997. "Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 68-72, May.
    2. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1999. "The Chilean Infrastructure Concessions Program: Evaluation, Lessons and Prospects for the Future," Documentos de Trabajo 60, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrés Pereyra, 2006. "Alternativas en el manejo del riesgo de demanda en concesiones de infraestructura vial," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 2206, Department of Economics - dECON.
    2. Shi, Shasha & Yin, Yafeng & An, Qingxian & Chen, Ke, 2021. "Optimal build-operate-transfer road contracts under information asymmetry and uncertainty," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 65-86.
    3. Y. Biondi, 2011. "Cost of capital, discounting and relational contracting: endogenous optimal return and duration for joint investment projects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(30), pages 4847-4864.
    4. Pijoan-Mas, Josep & di Giovanni, Julian & García-Santana, Manuel & Moral-Benito, Enrique, 2022. "Government Procurement and Access to Credit: Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Implications," CEPR Discussion Papers 17023, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Watling, D.P. & Shepherd, S.P. & Koh, A., 2015. "Cordon toll competition in a network of two cities: Formulation and sensitivity to traveller route and demand responses," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 93-116.
    6. Feng, Zhuo & Zhang, Yiwen & Zhang, Shuibo & Song, Jinbo, 2018. "Contracting and renegotiating with a loss-averse private firm in BOT road projects," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 40-72.
    7. Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2003. "Privatizing Highways in Latin America: Is It Possible to Fix What Went Wrong?," Working Papers 866, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    8. Nicolas Campos & Eduardo Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2019. "Renegotiations and corruption in infrastructure: The Odebrecht case," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0230, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    9. Chandan Kumar, 2018. "Role of bidding method and risk allocation in the performance of public private partnership (PPP) projects," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2018-013, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    10. van den Berg, Vincent A.C. & Rouwendal, Jan, 2016. "Tender auctions with existing operators bidding," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 1-10.
    11. Trujillo, Lourdes & Quinet, Emile & Estache, Antonio, 2000. "Forecasting the demand for privatized transport - What economic regulators should know, and why," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2446, The World Bank.
    12. Basso, Leonardo J. & Ross, Thomas W., 2018. "“Bidding the project” vs. “bidding the envelope” in public sector infrastructure procurements," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 61-75.
    13. Hakam Kamleh, 2005. "La nouvelle organisation ferroviaire britannique : sur la frontière entre intégration et désintégration," CAE Working Papers 28, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    14. Ganuza, Juan-José & Llobet, Gerard, 2020. "The simple economics of white elephants," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 91-100.
    15. Estache, Antonio & Guasch, Jose-Luis & Trujillo, Lourdes, 2003. "Price caps, efficiency payoffs, and infrastructure contract renegotiation in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3129, The World Bank.
    16. Alberto Chong & Florencio de, 2003. "The Truth about Privatization in Latin America," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm436, Yale School of Management.
    17. Mark Lijesen & Victoria Shestalova, 2007. "Public and private roles in road infrastructure: an exploration of market failure, public instruments and government failure," CPB Document 146, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    18. John Hall, 1998. "Private opportunity, public benefit?," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(2), pages 121-140, May.
    19. Caillaud, Bernard & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Essential facility financing and market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 667-694, March.
    20. Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet & Stéphane Saussier, 2006. "Auctions, Ex Post Competition And Prices: The Efficiency Of Public‐Private Partnerships," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 521-554, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; public opinion; role of government; government policy; regulation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:2008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Doneschi or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/derauuy.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.