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Asignación De Riesgos En Concesiones Viales: Evaluación De La Aplicación De Mecanismos De Mitigación De Riesgos En Contratos De Concesión En Uruguay

  • Andres Pereyra


    (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

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    In infrastructure franchising, risks must be allocated to the agent that can handle them. To mitigate risks that the concessionaire can not handle with should decrease the return required by the concessionaire and increase the expected return of the Government. In this paper we analyze a particular franchise contract in Uruguay, and we try to measure those effects when risks are mitigated. We use simulation techniques, using different hypothesis about the way risk averse agents take decisions under uncertainty. In the case we analyze, the impact of mitigating risks of the concessionaire diminish its expected result in about 40%, although the expected result of the Government increase in a no significant way.

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    Paper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 2008.

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    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:2008
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