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Alternativas en el manejo del riesgo de demanda en concesiones de infraestructura vial

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  • Andrés Pereyra

    (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

Abstract

In road concessions – where the effort of the concessionaire cannot increase the demand for infrastructure – it is better not to allocate risk of demand into the concessionaire. Engel et. al. (1997) introduced variable term concessions in order to mitigate risk of demand allocated to the concessionaire. In this paper we introduce variable investment concessions to achieve the same target. We show that both mechanisms are equivalent in their objective of mitigate risk of demand, although the mechanism proposed is more difficult to be implemented. We compare the application of both mechanism in the case of Uruguay.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Pereyra, 2006. "Alternativas en el manejo del riesgo de demanda en concesiones de infraestructura vial," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 2206, Department of Economics - dECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:2206
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/2065
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 1997. "Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 68-72, May.
    3. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1999. "The Chilean Infrastructure Concessions Program: Evaluation, Lessons and Prospects for the Future," Documentos de Trabajo 60, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    concessions; infrastructure; roads;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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