Alternativas en el manejo del riesgo de demanda en concesiones de infraestructura vial
In road concessions – where the effort of the concessionaire cannot increase the demand for infrastructure – it is better not to allocate risk of demand into the concessionaire. Engel et. al. (1997) introduced variable term concessions in order to mitigate risk of demand allocated to the concessionaire. In this paper we introduce variable investment concessions to achieve the same target. We show that both mechanisms are equivalent in their objective of mitigate risk of demand, although the mechanism proposed is more difficult to be implemented. We compare the application of both mechanism in the case of Uruguay.
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- Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 1997.
"Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 68-72, May.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1999. "The Chilean Infrastructure Concessions Program: Evaluation, Lessons and Prospects for the Future," Documentos de Trabajo 60, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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