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‘Incentive Aspects of Revenue Sharing: Central and Regional Government in Russia’

  • Plekhanov, A.

The paper provides an empirical analysis of fiscal incentives for Russian regional governments to foster economic growth and development. It points out several serious problems with previous empirical studies of fiscal incentives into Russian federalism, develops a new theoretical framework for the analysis of revenue-sharing policy between central and regional governments, paying particular attention to the case of non-benevolent authorities, and provides new estimates of incentive effects using an improved econometric methodology and a newly-collected dataset. Contrary to existing studies, incentives for regional governments are estimated to be present, but these incentive effects are considerably weaker in the short run than in the long run.

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0440.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0440.

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Length: 28
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0440
Note: PE
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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  1. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization. China versus Russia," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1889, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Maurice Obstfeld & Giovanni Peri, 1998. "Regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 205-259, 04.
  3. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  4. Pesaran, M.H. & Smith, R., 1992. "Estimating Long-Run Relationships From Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9215, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  5. Litwack, John M., 2002. "Central Control of Regional Budgets: Theory with Applications to Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 51-75, March.
  6. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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