Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments
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- Giampiero Giacomello & Luca Lambertini, 2016. "Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 535-548, August.
- Giampiero Giacomello & Luca Lambertini, 2013. "Defensive Weapons and Star Wars: A Supergame with Optimal Punishments," Working Paper series 57_13, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2011-04-02 (Game Theory)
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