Endogenous Coalition Formation With Identical Agents
Cooperative behavior often emerges at a group, rather than social level. In many instances we observe the formation of independent and sometime competing groups, teams, clubs, cooperatives (coalitions forshort) each of them persecuting the same goal (in turn provision of commodities, maximization of profits, raising of public funds, standards of behavior etc.).
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- Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1986.
Economics Working Papers
8616, University of California at Berkeley.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1988. " Increasing Returns to Size and Their Limits," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 259-73.
- Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
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