Independence within Government : A Comparative Perspective on Central Banking in Norway 1945-1970
This article surveys the degree of central bank independence in Norway between 1945 and 1970. By comparing the developments in Norway with those of Sweden and the United Kingdom, it is shown that the Norwegian central bank had less room for maneuver than in the other countries. In spite of a high legal independence, the actual performance of central bank operations was almost completely subordinated the instructions given by the Ministry of Finance. A particular vivid, dirigiste environment followed the experiences of the 1930s and the war in Norway, curtailing any effort to make the central bank an independent institution in the machinery of state economic management that followed the return to peace.
|Date of creation:||05 Jan 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Postboks 1179 Sentrum, 0107 Oslo|
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