The Behavioural Consequences of Unfair Punishment
Experimental evidence from public good games with punishment suggests that punishment works when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-cooperators. This paper reports an experiment in which punishment is assigned unfairly in the sense that it is not linked to individual behaviour and is melted out to all group members (irrespective of their prior behaviour). We test whether unfair punishment generates different contribution and punishment behaviour relative to the standard punishment game. Our findings suggest different dynamics of average contributions in the presence of unfair punishment relative to the standard punishment game. Contribution levels are significantly different only when subjects have obtained experience from both games. We also find that, although the assignment of punishment is unaffected after the experience of an environment with unfair punishment, a history of unfair punishment makes a difference regarding reactions to alleviation, reward and punishment received.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT|
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Laurent Denant-Boemont & David Masclet & Charles Noussair, 2007.
"Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 145-167, October.
- Laurent Denant-Boèmont & David Masclet & Charles Noussair, 2007. "Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment," Post-Print halshs-00144843, HAL.
- David Masclet & Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Charles Noussair, 2006. "Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment," Working Papers halshs-00009664, HAL.
- Denant-Boemont, L. & Masclet, D. & Noussair, C.N., 2007. "Punishment, counterpunishment, and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment," Other publications TiSEM bf51dcf1-7064-41d1-8560-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:10-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colin Rowat)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.