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The minimal quota for a complete and transitive majority relation

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  • Vidu, Laurent

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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  • Vidu, Laurent, 2017. "The minimal quota for a complete and transitive majority relation," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 316, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:316
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2909884/2910104
    File Function: First Version, 1999
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    2. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    5. Young, H. P., 1988. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1231-1244, December.
    6. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
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