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Autonomía de la Banca Central e Inflación: La Experiencia Colombiana, 1923-1995

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  • Adolfo Meisel Roca

Abstract

Con el aumento generalizado en los niveles de inflaci�n a partir de la culminaci�n en 1973 del acuerdo de Bretton Woods, en la cual las tasas de cambio fijas serv�an como "anclas nominales" del r�gimen monetario, se han venido presentando diferentes alternativas para tratar de garantizar la estabilidad en el nivel de precios. Una de las primeras propuestas para lograr estabilizar los precios fue la Milton Friedman, quien sostuvo que ello se pod�a lograr si los bancos centrales segu�a una pol�tica monetaria determinada por una regla de crecimiento fija y pre-anunciada. Sin embargo, se puede demostrar que en general no resulta �ptimo que el banco central siempre se ajuste a una regla fija, ya que elimina su capacidad para responder a perturbaciones no-anticipadas, especialmente los choques de oferta (1). Una propuesta mucho m�s radical para lograr la estabilidad en los precios es la de F.A. Hayek de 1976 (2). El argumento de este autor es que con la desnacionalizaci�n del dinero se puede lograr estabilidad en los precios. El sistema que propuso fue uno de competencia en la emisi�n privada del papel moneda inconvertible. Los bancos emisores tendr�an el incentivo de obtener fondos libres de inter�s al inducir a los consumidores a poseer sus billetes. Es lo que se conoce en la literatura como un r�gimen de banca libre. Como resultado de esta propuesta "exc�ntrica", se despert� un enorme inter�s acad�mico por el tema de la banca libre, un tipo de organizaci�n bancaria que existi� en muchos pa�ses antes que se consolidara el esquema de los bancos �nicos para emisi�n de billetes. En la banca libre no hay barreras a la entrada del negocio bancario y no hay control central de las reservas (3). (1) Al respecto v�ase Kenneth Rogoff, "The Optimal Degree of Comittment to an intermediate Monetary Target", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.2, #4, Nov.1985. (2) F.A.Hayek, The Denationalization of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of concur
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Suggested Citation

  • Adolfo Meisel Roca, 1996. "Autonomía de la Banca Central e Inflación: La Experiencia Colombiana, 1923-1995," Borradores de Economia 049, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:049
    DOI: 10.32468/be.49
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    3. Rockoff, Hugh, 1974. "The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(2), pages 141-167, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mejía Cubillos, Javier, 2012. "Propuesta metodológica para el cálculo del riesgo sistémico financiero en estudios de Historia Económica: Aplicación para el caso de la banca libre en Antioquia, 1888 [A methodology for assessing f," MPRA Paper 35460, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Juan C. Jaramillo & Roberto Steiner & Natalia Salazar, 1999. "The political economy of exchange rate policy in Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 9194, Fedesarrollo.

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