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Lessons from the Early Establishment of Banking Supervision in Italy (1926-1936)

Author

Listed:
  • Dario Pellegrino

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Marco Molteni

    (Pembroke College, University of Oxford)

Abstract

In this paper we describe the establishment and assess the relevance of banking supervision in Italy between 1926 and 1936. This case is particularly interesting from the international perspective, Italy having been the first European country to assign substantial supervision to its central bank, a few years before the 1929 crisis. Notwithstanding insufficient regulation and a light touch concerning the four major mixed banks, we document considerable enforcement of the law, which went beyond the initial provisions, thanks to the rather proactive supervisory approach adopted by the Bank of Italy. We point out a significant impact on the banking system: systematic archival analysis reveals that supervision fostered capital accumulation and mitigated lending concentration. Preliminary evidence suggests that supervision information enhanced effective lending of last resort during the crisis. Our educated guess is that, in the absence of the new supervisory set-up, the severity of the financial turmoil in the early 1930s in Italy would have been much fiercer, especially for small and medium-sized banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Dario Pellegrino & Marco Molteni, 2021. "Lessons from the Early Establishment of Banking Supervision in Italy (1926-1936)," Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers) 48, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:workqs:qse_48
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking supervision; capital requirements; banking history; lending of last resort;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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