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Do incentives and organizational innovations affect the performance of public administrations? Lessons from the Italian NRRP

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Accetturo

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Audinga Baltrunaite

    (Bank of Italy, CEPR)

  • Elena Lazzaro

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Anna Laura Mancini

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

We examine how incentives and organizational innovations affect the performance of public administrations in delivering infrastructure, a core public good. We study Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), which combines an unprecedented investment programme with a distinctive governance model for the delivery of projects, based on performance-based conditionality, simplified procedures, a qualification system for contracting authorities, and economic incentives to accelerate the awarding and the start of the projects. Exploiting variation within and across municipalities, we find that the NRRP significantly improved procurement awarding. In particular, the performance-oriented approach played a central role in boosting administrative performance and was further enhanced by the qualification system for procuring authorities. In the execution phase, the higher initial liquidity contributed to the rapid start of construction projects. We do not detect appreciable effects on the subsequent progress, likely reflecting the lack of adequate performance incentives for private counterparts in the design of the NRRP.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Accetturo & Audinga Baltrunaite & Elena Lazzaro & Anna Laura Mancini, 2026. "Do incentives and organizational innovations affect the performance of public administrations? Lessons from the Italian NRRP," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 1016, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_1016_26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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