IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpemic/doi10.1086-732654.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Decarolis
  • Raymond Fisman
  • Paolo Pinotti
  • Silvia Vannutelli

Abstract

The benefits of bureaucratic discretion depend on its use for public benefit versus private gain. Using data on Italian firms and procurement officials investigated for corruption, we show that discretionary auctions (awarded on the basis of negotiation rather than open bidding) are linked to corruption only when competition is restricted. Corrupt officials favor these negotiated auctions, though they are used less often in administrations where at least one official is under investigation. This suggests that discretion enhances efficiency but also enables theft, leading monitors to limit discretion in high-corruption settings. Overall, competition helps authorities to harness discretion’s benefits while limiting its abuse.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Decarolis & Raymond Fisman & Paolo Pinotti & Silvia Vannutelli, 2025. "Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(2), pages 213-254.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpemic:doi:10.1086/732654
    DOI: 10.1086/732654
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/732654
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/732654
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/732654?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpemic:doi:10.1086/732654. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPEMI .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.