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Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India

Author

Listed:
  • Rajat Kathuria

    (Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER))

  • Mansi Kedia

    (Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER))

  • Richa Sekhani
  • Kaushambi Bagchi

Abstract

Designing spectrum auctions are always fraught with risk. The over reliance on reserve prices may not necessarily yield successful market outcomes. There are several other factors that influence auction outcomes such as bidder turnouts, market conditions and choice of auctioning agent.The auction design is also crucial. India currently follows a Simultaneous Multi-Round Ascending Auction (SMRA) which, while providing the option of price discovery, also poses an aggregation risk. Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCA), are a popular alternative as they avoid aggregation risks and are arguably more efficient. However, they are complex and require sophisticated bidder participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajat Kathuria & Mansi Kedia & Richa Sekhani & Kaushambi Bagchi, 2019. "Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India," Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) Report 19-r-04, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, India.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdc:report:19-r-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmalensee, Richard, 1984. "Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 211-230, January.
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