Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure and Corruption
During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize public decision making. Such reforms have proved controversial. Critics of these reforms argue that decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption. Proponents of these reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by bringing decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers people to hold government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long run. They further state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading infrastructure to underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such decentralization is also expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local financing. These debates, nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on infrastructure provision is scant or non-existent. Empirical work is hampered by a lack of reliable data on the incidence of corruption. This paper presents conceptual underpinnings of the impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesizes scant available empirical evidence to make a case for further empirical research to document the real world experiences to update our current state of knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.
|Date of creation:||14 Jan 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 404-413-0235|
Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tugrul Gurgur & Anwar Shah, 2008.
"Localization and corruption: panacea or pandora's box?,"
CEMA Working Papers
581, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
- Tugrul Gurgur & Anwar Shah, 2014. "Localization and corruption: panacea or pandora's box?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 109-136, May.
- Gurgur, Tugrul & Shah, Anwar, 2005. "Localization and corruption : panacea or pandora's box?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3486, The World Bank.
- International Monetary Fund, 2001. "Fiscal Decentralization and Governance; A Cross-Country Analysis," IMF Working Papers 01/71, International Monetary Fund.
- Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2000.
"Decentralization and corruption - evidence across countries,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2290, The World Bank.
- Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
- Christian R. Ahlin, 2001. "Corruption: Political Determinants and Macroeconomic Effects," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0126, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Seabright, Paul, 1996.
"Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
- Seabright, Paul, 1994. "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chand, Sheetal K. & Moene, Karl O., 1999.
"Controlling Fiscal Corruption,"
Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1129-1140, July.
- Jing Jin & Chunli Shen & Qian Wang & Heng-fu Zou, 2012. "Decentralization in China," CEMA Working Papers 546, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
- G. Gulsun Arikan, 2004. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(2), pages 175-195, 03.
- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Banfield, Edward C, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 587-605, December.
- Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1418. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Benson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.