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Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control

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  • Balietti, Anca
  • Budjan, Angelika
  • Eymess, Tillmann
  • Soldà, Alice

Abstract

Information can trigger unpleasant emotions. As a result, individuals might be tempted to willfully ignore it. We experimentally investigate whether increasing perceived control can mitigate strategic ignorance. Participants from India were presented with a choice to receive information about the health risk associated with air pollution and later asked to recall it. We find that perceived control leads to a substantial improvement in information retention. Moreover, perceived control mostly benefits optimists, who show both a reduction in information avoidance and an increase in information retention. This latter result is confirmed with a US sample. A theoretical framework rationalizes these findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Balietti, Anca & Budjan, Angelika & Eymess, Tillmann & Soldà, Alice, 2023. "Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control," Working Papers 0730, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:awi:wpaper:0730
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    References listed on IDEAS

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