The Chi-Compromise Value For Non-Transferable Utility Games
We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Ω-value introduced by Bergantiños, Casas-Méndez, and Vázquez-Brage (2000). The main difference being that the maximal aspiration a player may have in the game is his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution. We show that it is well defined on the class of totally essential and non-level games. We propose an extensive-form game whose subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs coincide with the Chi-compromise value. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
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- Borm, P.E.M. & Keiding, H. & McLean, R.P. & Oortwijn, S. & Tijs, S.H., 1992.
"The compromise value for NTU-games,"
Other publications TiSEM
cb1df340-6f44-4cb5-ae3b-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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"The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(1), pages 37-47.
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114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
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